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Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of
Threshold E¤ects: Theory and Evidence.
Abstract
We study the joint determination of corruption and economic growth. Our model can
generate multiple equilibria when complementarity between corruption and growth is su¢ -
ciently strong. Our estimates of the impact of corruption on growth take into account that
corruption is endogenous and that there may exist di¤erent growth/corruption regimes. In
a cross section of countries in the 1990s, we identify two regimes, conditional on the quality
of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption
has a negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption
has, overall, little impact on growth, but, if anything, the impact is, surprisingly, positive.
Keywords: Growth; corruption; threshold e¤ects; governance; democracy; corruption.
JEL Classication: D72; D82.
1 Introduction
Corruption, economic growth, and the quality of political institutions are related through
a complex web. It is widely acknowledged that corruption can be detrimental to economic
growth because of the disincentive e¤ects on innovation and capital accumulation and
because of misallocation of talent across productive and unproductive activities.1 It is also
understood that corruption can be self-reinforcing with the potential to generate multiple
equilibria and corruption/growth traps and that political institutions can foster or hinder
corruption.2 Yet, many questions remain unanswered, both theoretically and empirically.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we develop a political econ-
omy model that allows us to characterize equilibrium levels of corruption and economic
growth and to highlight a new channel through which economic growth has a (negative)
feedback e¤ect on corruption. The model allows for multiple equilibria due to a threshold
e¤ect. Second, treating corruption and growth as endogenous variables, we provide new ev-
idence on the impact of corruption on growth. The novelty of the empirical contribution is
that we estimate a non-linear growth model that allows for threshold e¤ects. We show that
1See, for example, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Acemoglu (1995) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
2See, for example, Murphy et al., (1991, 1993). A number of other self-reinforcing mechanisms are
discussed in Aidt (2003).
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the quality of political institutions determines in which of two possible growth/corruption
regimes a country nds itself and estimate the regime-specic marginal growth e¤ect of
corruption.
The theoretical model considers a society where rulers interpreted as politicians or
dictators depending on the context extract rents from the private citizens by charging a
fee for entry into the formal sector of the economy. Citizens can decide to shelter themselves
from rent extraction (the fee) in the informal sector, but at the cost of lower wages and
the loss of access to valuable public services, such as the legal system. Citizens in the
formal sector attempt to reduce corruption by threatening to replace a ruler that extracts
rents too greedily. In a democracy, this usually takes place through orderly elections, while
in autocracies, but occasionally also in democracies, replacement may take place through
coups, revolts or revolutions. Rulers are willing, up to a point, to reduce corruption today
to avoid replacement and loss of rents in the future.
We show that economic growth can reduce corruption by changing the incentives faced
by the rulers. Conversely, we also allow corruption to reduce growth through two channels:
corruption has an adverse impact on innovations and reduces the scope for learning-by-
doing externalities. Together these e¤ects imply that economic growth and corruption are
self-reinforcing: high growth reduces corruption which, in turn, enhances the growth per-
formance of the economy. This can, under some circumstances, lead to multiple equilibria
and a threshold e¤ect.
We make a distinction between two types of governance failures: q- and p-failures. A
p-failure arises when citizens cannot promise for sure to keep a ruler who behaved well in
o¢ ce. This type of problem, typically, arises in democracies with volatile voter turnout
or general apathy among the electorate. A q-failure arises when citizens cannot replace
under-performing politicians with certainty. This type of problem arises in countries with
weak institutions, wide-spread electoral fraud, intimidation of opposition by the ruling
elite, or where the political power is concentrated in the hands of a dictator. We show
that an improvement in the quality of institutions increases the growth rate of an economy
by reducing rent extraction and that the quality of institutions is a key determinant of
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whether growth traps exist or not.
The empirical analysis employes the threshold model proposed by Caner and Hansen
(2004) to estimate a non-linear growth model that allows economic growth and corruption
to be jointly determined and for the possibility of multiple growth/corruption regimes. We
use data on real GDP growth, corruption (as measured by Transparency Internationals
corruption perception index) and political institutions (as measured by an index of the
quality of democratic institutions constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999)) from a cross-
section of 68 countries in the 1990s. We nd the following main results. First, the data
identify two growth/corruption regimes. The threshold determining whether a country is
in one regime rather than the other is a function of the quality of political institutions.
Second, in the regime with high quality institutions, corruption and growth are negatively
related. The impact of a one unit increase in corruption reduces growth with between 0.14
and 0.28 percentage points in our preferred specication. In the regime with low quality
institutions, corruption has, overall, little impact on growth but, if anything, the impact
is, surprisingly, positive.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief survey of exist-
ing empirical research in the area. In Section 3, we set out the model. In Section 4,
we study the impact of (exogenous) growth on corruption and highlight an new channel
through which economic growth can reduce corruption. In Section 5, we specify a simple
endogenous growth mechanism that allows corruption to a¤ect growth. In Section 6, we
study equilibrium congurations of the overall model and demonstrate through a sequence
of examples the possibility of threshold e¤ects and multiple equilibria. In Section 7, we
discuss our empirical strategy. In Section 8, we present the empirical results. In Section
9, we discuss the ndings.
2 The Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on corruption has expanded rapidly in recent years, not the least
as a consequence of new survey-based measures of corruption. Roughly speaking, this lit-
erature can be divided into two groups: i) studies that focus on the economic consequences
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of corruption, and ii) studies that focus on the determinants of corruption.
The consequences of corruption are many, and we shall limit the discussion to those
that have a direct bearing on economic growth.3 In his two seminal papers on the topic,
Mauro (1995, 1998) reports that corruption is weakly related to long-run growth in a
cross section of countries from around the world, but strongly (negatively) related to
the share of investments. Gyimah-Brempong (2002), focussing on a panel of African
countries, presents evidence that corruption decreases economic growth both directly and
indirectly through decreased investments in physical capital. Mo (2001), in a study of
the transmission channels through which corruption may a¤ect growth, reports that the
most important channel is political instability. Wie (2000) and Lambsdor¤ (2003) show
how corruption may have an adverse impact on foreign direct investment and net capital
inows, both of which are important determinants of economic growth.4 In all these
studies, the relationship between corruption and growth (or its constituents) is assumed
to be linear, thereby ruling out the possibility of threshold e¤ects and other forms of
nonlinearity.5 One exception is a recent study by Mendez and Sepulveda (2005). They
argue that the relationship between corruption and growth is non-monotonic, but do not
allow for threshold e¤ect, and present evidence that corruption has a benecial impact on
long-run growth at low levels of incident but is harmful at high levels of incident in a cross
section of countries.
The empirical literature on the causes of corruption has also expanded rapidly in recent
years. Three broad classes of potential determinants have received particular attention:
economic factors, cultural and historical factors, and institutional factors. Among the eco-
nomic factors, it is well-established that poor countries are perceived to be more corrupt
than rich countries (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002). In addition, high levels of government
3See the surveys by Rose-Ackerman (1999), Bardhan (1997), and Jain (2001) for further details.
4In addition to the direct evidence, a number of factors that may be indirectly related to corruption have
been found to reduce growth. This includes negative relationships between growth and political instability
(Alesina et al., 1996), income inequality (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994) and lack
of protection of property rights (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Democracy per se is not strongly related to
growth (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993), although Barro (1996) does nd a non-linear e¤ect suggesting a
positive relationship at low levels and a negative relationship for medium levels of political freedom.
5In addition, it is an open question how robustly related corruption is to growth in linear models (see
Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004).
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regulation (or lack of economic freedom) is associated with high levels of perceived corrup-
tion.6 Some cultural factors, such as religion, have also been found to a¤ect corruption,
with Protestant countries being associated with relatively low (perceived) corruption levels
(Paldam, 2001). Many institutional and political variables are also related to corruption.
Paldam (2002) shows that democracy decreases corruption, while Treisman (2000) argues
that it is the length of exposure to democracy and whether a country has a history of
British rule that matter.7 Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1999) stress that a coun-
trys legal tradition is an important determinant of corruption. Lederman et al. (2005)
show, using a cross country panel covering the period 1984-1999, that measures of democ-
racy, political (in)stability, and (lack of) freedom of the press are important determinants
of corruption and that other factors, such as legal tradition, and openness to trade, lose
their importance once political variables are taken into account.8 Underlying all these
studies is an implicit or explicit presumption that economic, cultural, and institutional
factors are causally linked to corruption.
We contribute to the literature on the causes and consequences of corruption in two
ways. First, we are explicit, both theoretically and empirically, about the joint determina-
tion of corruption and growth. We borrow from the literature on the causes of corruption
the notion that some political factors (e.g., democracy and legal tradition) as well as some
cultural factors, captured by natural and historical conditions, are exogenous determinants
of corruption, but argue that corruption and economic outcomes (growth) are both endoge-
nous.9 Second, we take the possibility of thresholds and multiple equilibria into account.
As far as we are aware, there is only one other paper in the literature on (the causes of)
6Other economic factors that are related to perceived corruption include ination (Paldam, 2002),
openness to trade (Ades and di Tella, 1999) and scal decentralization (Fisman and Gatti, 2002).
7Persson et al. (2003) argue that the institutional details matter and show that a switch from strictly
proportional to strictly majoritarian elections has a small negative impact on corruption. A long similar
lines, Chang and Golden (2005) show that countries with a closed-list tend to have higher levels of
corruption than countries with an open-list PR system.
8Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) examine all these various determinants of corruption using the Extreme
Bounds Analysis of Sala-i-Martin (1997). They nd that the quality of bureaucracy, government e¤ec-
tiveness, government wages, decentralization, military spending, political freedom and the nature of the
judiciary system are robustly related to corruption.
9This possibility has been acknowledged by Mauro (1995) and others.
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corruption that considers thresholds empirically. Haque and Kneller (2004) estimate, using
the technique of Hansen (2000), a threshold model with the aim of identifying corruption
clubs. They use GDP per capita as the exogenous variable that determines the threshold.
In contrast, we allow for endogeneity of corruption in a growth model that focuses on
the consequences of corruption and use measures of the quality of political institutions to
identify the threshold.
Our paper is also related to the literature on growth models with multiple steady
states.10 The seminal paper by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) analyze a neoclassical growth
model with threshold e¤ects. Using regression tree techniques to identify groups of coun-
tries that obey a common linear model, they nd four separate growth regimes depending
on income per capita and adult literacy. In contrast, we are interested in growth/corruption
regimes that are identied by the quality of political institutions and use a di¤erent sta-
tistical technique to identify the regimes.
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001) and others have demonstrated the
importance of institutional factors in explaining the world distribution of income. The
approach is to use deep historical factors broadly capturing Western inuenceto gener-
ate exogenous variation in institutions or social infrastructure.11 Recently, Persson (2004)
has argued that certain constitutional rules, such as age of democracy, can be used as
instruments for structural policies (including corruption) in studies that aim at explaining
di¤erences in income levels across the world. We build on this literature in our choice of
instruments for corruption and argue that a mixture of deep historical or cultural factors
(size of country and distance from equator) and constitutional rules (age of democracy,
political accountability, and legal tradition) can generate the required exogenous varia-
tion in corruption levels that allow us to estimate regime-specic relationships between
corruption and growth.
10See Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Durlauf (1993) and Gradstein (2004) for theoretical underpinnings.
11These factors include distance from equator, fraction of English speakers and settler mortality factors
which a¤ect current economic performance, it is argued, only through they inuence on the quality of
institutions.
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3 The Model
3.1 The Economy
We consider a society populated by a continuum of individuals with measure 1. Individuals
are indexed by i and live for ever. Each individual has one unit of labour each period that
is inelastically supplied to either the formal or the informal sector. In the formal sector,
individuals are either employed by private rms or by the public sector. Private rms
produce a consumption good, ct, with constant returns to scale using labour as the only
input and pay the competitive wage wt = at, where at is productivity. The consumption
good is traded internationally at a xed price, normalized to 1. The public sector produces
public services, yt. The production technology is yt = atxt ; with  2 (0; 1), where xt is the
labour input devoted to the production of public services. Public sector workers are paid
the wage wt. To operate in the formal sector, individuals have to pay a fee  t, leaving them
with net income at(1   t). The cost of providing public services, wtxt, is nanced out of
current fee revenue. In the informal sector, individuals can avoid the fee, but their income
is only a fraction of their income in the formal sector. We denote income earned in the
informal sector by iwt, where i 2 [0; ] is the productivity of individual i in that sector.
Productivity in the informal sector is distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function F (i). We require that F is di¤erentiable and (weakly) concave. All income,
net of fees, is spent on private consumption each period. Only individuals employed in
the formal sector have access to public services. Instantaneously utility is cit + iyt where
i = 1 if individual i is employed in the formal sector and i = 0 otherwise. Utility is
discounted with the factor  2 (0; 1].
The fee and the public service play an important role in determining the allocation
of resources between sectors: a high  t or a low yt encourage individuals to work in
the informal sector. The fee should be interpreted broadly as the cost that individuals
face when operating in the formal economy because of government intervention. This,
of course, includes tax payments, but also, depending on the context, the cost of getting
the necessary permits to operate in that sector.12 Public services should be interpreted
12De Soto (1990) and Djankov et al. (2002) have shown that this is an important consideration in many
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as law and order, legal services and so on that individuals have access to only if they are
formally integrated in the economy.13 For example, individuals in the informal sector of a
less developed country would not be able to use the legal system to enforce contracts, nor
would a carpenter working in the black economy of a developed country.
Individual i decides to work in the formal sector if, and only if at(1   t)+ atxat  iat.
The fee revenue at time t accordingly is
Tt = wt tF (1   t + xat ): (1)
Productivity grows over time, due to technological progress at+1 = at(1 + gt) with gt  0
and a0 > 0.14 We restrict attention to constant growth paths with gt = g for all t. We
notice that, for given  t and xt, total revenue increases over time, in line with productivity,
as does (recorded) national income, Yt = wtF (1   t+ xat ), and potential national income,
Y Pt = at = wt. We return to how productivity growth is determined along a constant
growth path in Section 5 and take g as being exogenously given for now.
3.2 The Political System
The society is governed by a ruler. Depending on the context, the ruler may be a de-
mocratically elected politician, a dictator or someone in between. The ruler oversees the
production of public services, collects fees, and extracts rents from citizens by choosing  t
and xt subject to the budget constraint wtxt  Tt. The rent extracted in period t is
denoted zt and corresponds to the di¤erence between current revenues and expenditures:15
zt = Tt   wtxt: (2)
less developed countries. See Aidt and Dutta (2004) for a theoretical model of corruption and industrial
licences.
13In reality, individuals working in the informal sector of the economy may have access to some public
services, but, typically, not to all. It is straightforward to modify the model to allow individuals in the
informal sector to have access to some, or even all, public services. The results are essentially una¤ected.
14To ensure that discounted utility is bounded, we assume that (1 + g)  1.
15This formulation was introduced by Persson et al. (1997) and is used extensively by Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
9
We assume that actual and potential rulers care only about their consumptionof zt and
that rents can only be extracted if in o¢ ce.16 ;17 We shall think of zt as a measure of rent
extraction.18 The rent can be interpreted as income from corruption: the ruler is charging
for access to the formal sector in excess of what is required to nance public services.
In the absence of further incentives, rulers extract the maximum rent each period. To
avoid this, societies develop political institutions that moderate the behavior of rulers.
These institutions allow citizens to hold their rulers accountable and to replace the in-
cumbent if he extracts too much rent. In a fully democratic society, elections serve this
role (Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter 3), but even in autocracies and
dictatorships, rulers are constrained by the threat of a coup or a popular revolt. Formally,
at the beginning of each period, citizens announce a performance standard that the ruler
has to satisfy to be reelectedat the end of the period. Citizens can observe perfectly
what the ruler does while in o¢ ce (i.e., zt, xt and  t) and so they can base the performance
standard on observed policies. We denote the performance standard announced at the be-
ginning of period t by bst = fb t; bxtg. The standard requires the ruler to spend a minimum
amount on public services xt  bxt and to keep the fee below a certain threshold  t  b t.
The two conditions combined e¤ectively determine how much rent extraction is allowed.
For simplicity, we assume that only citizens in the formal sector have political voice.19
In a well-functioning democracy, a ruler (politician) who complies with the standard is
guaranteed re-election while a ruler (politician) who does not comply is certain of dismissal.
These promises are, however, not equally credible in all societies, and in autocracies or
dysfunctional democracies intimidation of the opposition, electoral fraud and so on can
16We assume that there is an innite supply of potential rulers all of whom care only about extracting
rents, and that rulers who are not holding o¢ ce get zero utility.
17More generally, rulers could also care about public services and pay fees. This complicates the analysis
but does not alter the results.
18As formulated, the rent is a pure transfer from citizens to the politician and no real resources are
(actually) wasted in the process of trying to obtain the rent. Nonetheless, we can think of zt as a measure
of what potential politicians would be willing to pay to gain o¢ ce (see Nitzan, 1994, for a survey of the
literature on rent seeking and rent dissipation).
19Similar results can be obtained if we assume that the consent of a majority of citizens is required to
replace the ruler and a majority works in the formal sector. The case where citizens in the informal sector
have political voice is left for future research.
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signicantly reduce the level of accountability. We make a distinction between two types
of governance failures:20
Assumption 1 (p-failure) Citizens can only promise to reappoint a ruler who satises bst
in period t with probability p 2 [0; 1].
Assumption 2 (q-failure) Citizens can only promise to dismiss a ruler who does not
satisfy bst in period t with probability q 2 [0; 1].
A perfect democracy corresponds to p = 1 and q = 0.21 A p-failure arises when
citizens cannot promise for sure to reward good behavior with reappointment. This type
of problem, typically, arises in situations with volatile voter turnout or general apathy
among the electorate, but otherwise strong democratic institutions. A q-failure arises
when citizens cannot, in all case, dismiss under-performing rulers, and a society with q
close to 1 can be interpreted as a dictatorship.22
The interaction between rulers and citizens (in the formal sector) can be summarized as
follows. At the beginning of each period, citizens announce a performance standard. Next,
the ruler collects fees and decides on public spending. This is observed by citizens. At the
end of the period, citizens judge the performance of the ruler against the standard and
decide if they want to reappoint the incumbent ruler or not. This together with random
events, as captured by p and q, determine whether the incumbent is, in fact, replaced by
another ruler. After this the sequence of events is repeated.
20We take these governance failures as given. For a theory of why the quality of governance (as captured
by protection of property rights) di¤ers across time and space, see Gradstein (2004).
21By perfectwe mean that citizens are able to use the only policy tool available to them the right
to dismiss rulers at election times as e¤ectively as possible. Since this type of implicit incentive contract
is fairly crude, it does not imply that citizens can control their rulers perfectly when p = 1 and q = 0.
In reality, asymmetric information, coordination failures and other factors make it di¢ cult for citizens to
control rulers even in societies with no p- or q-failures.
22Lassen (2000) studies the impact of q-failures on the size of government and show that tax revenues
are higher in societies where q is close to 0.
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4 Growth and Rent Extraction
Citizens must accept some corruption. This is because rulers are willing to give up ex-
tracting rents in the current period only if they expect to be allowed to seek rents in the
future. In the extreme, if citizens do not allow rent extraction at any time, reappointment
has no value, and all rulers would extract the maximum rent while in o¢ ce. Thus, the best
citizens can hope for in a democracy is to reduce corruption to the level that is compatible
with rulers wanting to be reappointed.
We characterize the sequence of incentive compatible performance standards as follows.
Suppose that citizens announce the standard bst = fb t; bxtg at time t. Dene bzt = bTt atbxt as
the rent extraction allowed by the standard. A ruler who complies (C) with the standard
at time t expects to get:
Vt(C) = bzt + pV t+1 (3)
where V t+1 is the continuation value of holding o¢ ce at the beginning of period t + 1.
We notice that future payo¤s are discounted by , as rulers have the same discount rate
as citizens. More importantly, for p < 1 citizens cannot promise to reappoint a well-
performing ruler with certainty, and so with probability 1 p, he might not get reappointed
and thereby foregoes the option of extracting rents in the future. This reduces his e¤ective
discount factor to p. The p-failure reduces the discount factor of rulers below that of
their constituents.
The ruler can alternatively deviate from the standard in period t and extract the
maximum rent. In this case, he sets
f t ; xtg = arg maxf t;xtg  tatF (1   t + x

t )  atxt: (4)
We note that  t = 
 and xt = x
 for all t23 and that the maximum rent Tt = atT is
23The rst order conditions
at [F (:)   tf(:)] = 0.
at

 tf(:)x
 1
t   1

= 0
imply that the solution is stationary. The second order condition is satised when F is concave.
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increases over time with
T = ( F (1      (x))  x) :
Citizens would, of course, want to replace the ruler at time t + 1, but with probability q,
they fail to achieve this. Thus, a ruler who deviates (D) from the performance standard
at time t expects to get
Vt(D) = Tt + qV t+1. (5)
We can now write the value of being the ruler, V t , as
V t = maxfVt(C); Vt(D)g (6)
and note that a sequence of performance standards fbstg1t=0 is incentive compatible if and
only if
Vt(C)  Vt(D) for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::. (7)
The next proposition characterizes the minimum rent that citizens must allow rulers to
extract along incentive compatibility paths.
Proposition 1 Assume (1 + g) < 1. Along paths with constant productivity growth,
incentive compatible performance standards must allow rulers to extract at least the rent
zt =
1  p(1 + g)
1  q(1 + g)atT (8)
for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::.
Corollary 1 A necessary condition for incentive compatibility is that p  q.
Citizens would never allow the ruler to collect more than the minimum rent required
for compliance, so bzt = zt for all t. Proposition 1, then, implies that a constant fraction
of (potential) GDP is, with the approval of citizens, extracted each period. The minimum
level of rent extraction depends on the quality of governance and on the growth rate of
GDP. As expected, societies with good institutions (high p or low q) must accept less
corruption. The corollary shows that societies with very bad institutions (q is high
13
and/or p low with q > p) perform extremely poorly because incentive compatibility fails
at each t. In such societies, no ruler ever complies with any performance standard, and the
only protection that citizens have against corruption is to move into the informal sector.
The impact of economic growth on the minimum level of rent extraction along incentive
compatible paths can be calculated from equation (8):
@

zt
at

@g
=
T (q   p)
(1  q(1 + g))2 : (9)
We see that this is non-positive for p > q and can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Growth and Rent Extraction) Assume that p  q. Economic growth
reduces the minimum rent required for compliance.
Proposition 2 shows that economic growth performs a very similar role to good
political institutions: it reduces rent extraction. In a society in which GDP and potential
rents (Tt) are growing, rulers have an incentive to postpone rent extraction because larger
rents can be collected in the future. This makes it easier for citizens to get rulers to comply
in the present and rent extraction along incentive compatible paths can be reduced. It is
important to notice, however, that two opposite e¤ects are at work. An increase in the
growth rate increases the continuation value of retaining o¢ ce. This, on the one hand,
makes rulers who decide to comply more amenable to reduce rent extraction today as long
as they can be fairly sure that this is rewarded with reappointment (p high). On the other
hand, the incentive to deviate from the performance standard and seek all available rents
is enhanced in societies with higher growth rates as long as there is a chance that rulers are
reappointed despite their misbehaviour (q > 0). Along incentive compatible paths p  q,
and the former e¤ect dominates. Economic growth can, therefore, serve as a substitute
for goodinstitutions.
Proposition 1 characterizes the irreducible level of rent extraction (zt ) in incentive
compatible economies for any path of fees and spending levels. Given zt = zt at each t,
the constrained e¢ cient paths of  t and xt solve the following problem
max
f t;xtg1t=0
1X
t=0
t [at(1   t) + atxat ] (10)
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subject to
zt = z

t t = 0; 1; 2; 3::: (11)
Tt = zt + atxt t = 0; 1; 2; 3::: (12)
where Tt = atF (1  t+xt ). The solution to this problem is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Tax Rates and Public Services) Assume that p  q and that F is uni-
form on [0; ]. Along a path with constant productivity growth, the constrained e¢ cient
performance standard is unique and stationary, i.e., bst = fb ; bxg for all t. Provision of
public services is growing over time in line with productivity
yt = at (bx) :
Moreover, b  and bx are continuous di¤erentiable functions of fg; p; qg with b  <   andbx > x.
Proposition 3 shows that the constrained e¢ cient performance standard is stationary
and that provision of public services grows over time in line with productivity. The ruler
reduces the fee below and increases the labour input for the production of public ser-
vices above the rent maximizing levels. More importantly, the size of the formal sector
F (1  b  + (bx)) is a function of the growth rate g (and p and q):
Proposition 4 (Growth and the Size of the Formal Sector) Assume that p > q and that F
is uniform on [0; ]. Along a path with constant productivity growth, the size of the formal
sector is non-decreasing in the growth rate.
Proposition 4 shows that the formal sector is large in economies with fast growth. Intu-
itively, a high growth rate reduces the rent required for incentive compatibility (Proposition
2) because the ruler is more eager not to be replaced. Consequently, the fee is reduced and
more public services are provided. This induces some individuals who previously sheltered
themselves in the informal sector to move into the formal sector.
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5 Rent Extraction and Growth
In the analysis above, we established that (exogenous) economic growth can reduce rent
extraction and make it more attractive to seek employment in the formal sector. Numerous
studies have pointed out the opposite possibility, namely that corruption is detrimental to
economic growth. Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), for example, argue that vested interests
associated with knowledge of how to operate older vintages of technology sometimes block
the adoption of the most recent technology and therefore growth. Along similar lines,
Dutta (2000) argues that failures by existing social or political institutions to assign the
benets of progress appropriately leads to growth conicts between workers and capital
owners in economies with credit constraints. Misallocation of talent between entrepre-
neurship and rent seeking is another important reason why corruption hinders growth
(Acemoglu, 1995, Acemoglu and Verdier 1998, Murphy et al. 1991, 1993).
To capture the possibility of a negative feedback e¤ect from corruption to growth,
we assume that the growth rate of the economy is proportional to the fraction of the
population employed in the formal sector24
g = G[F (1   + x)] (13)
where G is a strictly increasing function with either congestion (G00 < 0) or agglomeration
(G00 > 0) e¤ects. This formulation of the feedback from corruption to growth can be
motivated in a number of ways. First, industrial production in the formal sector, typically,
generates learning-by-doing externalities with the potential to increase the growth rate of
the economy (Arrow, 1962, Lucas, 1988). Activities in the informal sector are less likely
to generate such externalities at a scale that has macroeconomic implications. Second,
individuals working in the formal sector have access to the legal system. This helps protect
property rights and to enforce contracts. This spurs the incentive to produce growth-
enhancing innovations.
This specication of the growth process implies that economic growth and corruption
become endogenous and self-reinforcing: high growth reduces rent extraction which, in
24An alternative is to assume, as in Murphy et al. (1991), that the growth rate of the economy is
determined by the ability of the most able self-employed person in the economy.
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turn, by making working in the formal sector more attractive, enhances the growth of the
economy. This opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria and threshold e¤ects.
6 Equilibria
We assume citizens do not internalize the impact on the growth rate when they set the
performance standard. This seems reasonable insofar as growth is generated by unintended
learning-by-doing externalities.25 Given that, we dene an equilibrium of the economy as
a situation in which citizens and the ruler make optimal choices for a given (constant)
growth rate and in which the actual growth rate of the economy is consistent with these
choices:
g = G [F (1  b (g) + (bx (g)))] (14)
for g 2 [0; 1 

). Equation (14) has no, one or more solutions depending on circumstances.26
We begin the analysis by considering how a given equilibrium is a¤ected by a change in
the quality of political institutions. We assume that some individuals are employed in the
informal sector both before and after the change. Applying the implicit function theorem
to equation (14), we nd
dg
dp
=
 G0(:)f(:)@b
@p
1 +G0(:)f(:)@b
@g
(15)
and
dg
dq
=
 G0(:)f(:)@b
@q
1 +G0(:)f(:)@b
@g
; (16)
where b = 1 b +(bx). We note that 1+G0(:)f(:)@b
@g
is positive if and only if the initial
equilibrium is locally stable in the sense that a small deviation from g would, through
25If citizens were to internalize the growth e¤ect when they set the performance standard, they would
maximize equation (10) subject to the incentive compatibility constraints, the budget constraint, and
g = G(F (:)). This would rule out expectation-based multiple equilibria of the type discussed below,
although the solution to this highly non-linear problem may still exhibit multiple solutions.
26A su¢ cient condition for existence of at least one equilibrium is that
1 > 

1 +G

F (1  b(1  

) +
bx1  


)

This is su¢ cient because G [F (1  b(0) + (bx (0)))] > 0 and F (1 b(g)+(bx (g))) is a non-decreasing
function of g.
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the choices of the citizens and of their ruler, lead to a self-correcting adjustment back to
that growth rate. It, therefore, follows that an improvement in the quality of institutions
increases growth and reduces rent extraction in situations where the economy is located
at a stable equilibrium.27 Better institutions lead to less rent extraction. This induces
more people to work in the market sector generating growth promoting externalities and
encouraging innovations. This, in turn, increases the growth rate of the economy. We note
that institutions a¤ect growth indirectly through their impact on rent extraction: for a
given level of corruption, variations in institutional quality do not a¤ect the growth rate.
Below, we discuss three examples that illustrate a range of possible equilibrium con-
gurations. The rst example has a unique and stable equilibrium and the other two
examples have three equilibria, two of which are stable. Throughout, we assume that F is
uniform on [0; ].
Unique equilibrium In the rst example, the economy has a unique equilibrium which
may or may not be interior. This conguration can happen in many cases. Assume, for
example, that G(m) = l + m and that  = 1
2
. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium for two
di¤erent values of  the maximum productivity levels in the informal sector.28 For  = 1,
some individuals decide to remain in the informal sector and the growth rate is g. For
 = 0:82, all individuals move into the o¢ cial sector and the equilibrium growth rate is
g > g. The kink in the equilibrium locus is caused by the fact that F (:) = 1 for all
g > g0. An improvement in the quality of institutions increases g, while g is una¤ected:
all individuals have already moved to the formal sector, so the improvement in institutional
quality does not lead to additional ows.
Multiple equilibria Multiple equilibria is a possibility because growth and corruption
are self-reinforcing: higher growth leads to lower rent extraction which allows the growth
rate to be higher. This can arise under a range of circumstances. One interesting possibility
is an economy in which it is almost impossible to replace rulers (q close to 1). In this
27After an improvement in the quality of institutions, unstable equilibria become associated with lower
growth and more rent seeking.
28The parameter values that generate this picture are p = 0:9, q = 0:1,  = 0:95,  = 0:025 and l = 0.
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Figure 1: Two economies with a unique equilibrium.
economy, a typical equilibrium conguration is shown in Figure 2.29 We see that this
economy has two stable equilibria: one at point A with relatively low growth and relatively
high levels of rent extraction and one at point C with high growth and low rent extraction.
A third unstable equilibrium is located in between the two others at point B. This suggests
that even near-dictatorships can experience high growth at equilibrium C. We can think
of point B as a threshold. An improvement in the quality of institutions can eliminate
the two low growth equilibria and induce the economy to move to equilibrium C where all
individuals work in the formal sector.
Another possibility that gives rise to a similar conguration is an economy with fairly
good institutions (q is close to 0 and p is close to 1) in which there are substantial agglom-
eration e¤ects associated with the learning-by-doing or innovation process (G00 >> 0).30
This suggests that it is also possible for societies with strong institutions to be trapped in
a low growth, high rent extraction equilibrium. Again, improvements in the quality of in-
stitutions can help the economy escape the trap. Both of these examples demonstrate the
quality of institutions is an important determinant of whether or not multiple equilibria
29The picture can be generated with the following parameter values:  = 0:9, p = 1, q = 0:99, F is
uniform on [0; 1:2] and G = l + F (:)k with l =  0:24,  = 0:5 and k = 2.
30An example of this is an economy with the following parameter values:  = 0:9, p = 0:9, q = 0:1, F
is uniform on [0; 1:22] and G = l + F (:)k with l =  0:34,  = 0:6 and k = 20.
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Figure 2: An economy with multiple equilibria.
and threshold e¤ects exist.
7 The Empirical Strategy
The theoretical analysis highlights two points that motivate our empirical investigation.
First, economic growth and corruption are jointly determined in equilibrium by (exoge-
nous) variations in the quality of political institutions and other exogenous factors, and
a¤ect each other negatively. Moreover, the quality of institutions only a¤ects growth in-
directly through its e¤ect on corruption. This suggests that measures of institutional
quality should be excluded from the estimated growth equation. Second, due to the
negative feedback mechanism between growth and corruption, there may exist multiple
growth/corruption regimes. The quality of political institutions is an important determi-
nant of whether or not this is the case, and we argue that institutional quality a¤ects the
growth performance of a country mainly through this channel. Our approach is to employ
recent advances in the econometrics of threshold models to deal with both points (Caner
and Hansen, 2004).
We assume that the relationship between corruption, economic growth and political
institutions in a cross section of i = 1; ::; 68 countries in the 1990s can be summarized by
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the following equation
gi = + 1ci1(qi  ) + 2ci1(qi > ) (17)
+1(qi  )xi3 + 1(qi > )xi4 + ei;
where gi measures growth of real GDP, ci is an (endogenous) measure of corruption, qi
is an (exogenous) measure of the quality of institutions, xi is a vector of (other) exoge-
nous variables known to a¤ect economic growth, 1(:) is an indicator function and  is a
threshold to be estimated. We assume that the error term follows a martingale di¤erence
sequence. The key feature of the growth model described in equation (17) is that it allows
for two distinct growth regimes. Once the threshold  has been estimated from the data,
the quality of political institutions (qi) determines which of the two possible regimes a
particular country belongs to. Moreover, the marginal impact of corruption and other
(exogenous) determinants of growth is regime specic.
Econometrically speaking, estimation of equation (17) is complicated by the fact that
corruption is an endogenous variable and that the error term (ei) is correlated with the
corruption variable, ci. Therefore, threshold models developed for the estimation of mod-
els with exogenous regressors (see Hansen, 2000) cannot be used. Instead, we estimate
equation (17) with the procedure developed by Caner and Hansen (2004). This procedure
allows right-hand side variables, in this case corruption, to be endogenous. The reduced
form equation for corruption is the conditional expectation of ci given x0i:
ci = f(x
0
i; ) + ui (18)
with E(uijx0i) = 0,  is an unknown parameter vector and ui is a random error. The vector
x0i contains some variables (instruments) not included in the growth regression along with
the other exogenous variables of the model. We discuss these instruments in more detail
below. This equation can be substituted into equation (17) to get:
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gi = + 1f(x
0
i; )1(qi  ) + 2f(x0i; )1(qi > ) (19)
+1(qi  )xi3 + 1(qi > )xi4 + vi
where
vi = 1ui1(qi  ) + 2ui1(qi > ) + ei (20)
The parameters of this equation can be estimated sequentially. First, Least Squares are
used to estimate the parameter vector  from the reduced form. Second, the threshold  is
chosen to minimize the sum of squared residuals from a sequence of regressions of growth
on the predicted value of corruption from the rst stage. Third, the regime-specic slope
parameters, 1 to 4, are estimated by GMM on the split sample implied by the estimate
of  using instrumental variables techniques.
Several business risk analysts and polling organizations routinely construct indexes of
"perceived" corruption, based on survey responses of business people, experts and local
residents.31 Our preferred measure of corruption is the average from 1996 to 2002 of the
corruption perception index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International. This is a
composite index that is compiled by researchers based at the University of Gottingen. It
uses information from a number of individual surveys and ratings. For example, the 1998
index is based on 12 surveys from 7 di¤erent institutions. Most of the primary indices
are rst converted to a common scale and they are averaged to produce the corruption
perception index, which varies between 10 (the least corrupt country) to 0 (the most
corrupt country). Compared to other indices of corruption, the corruption perception
index has the advantage that it is available for recent years. In addition, as it is based on
averages from di¤erent sources, one might hope that measurement errors wash out.32
31These indices, typically, measure corruption as the likelihood that government o¢ cials would demand
bribes in exchange for special licenses, policy protection, biased judicial sentences, avoidance of taxes and
regulations or simply to expedite government procedures.
32It is also worth noting that the sub-indices of the CPI are highly correlated both with each other and
across time. Furthermore, indices of perceived corruption constructed from surveys of business people
match well with indices constructed from cross-sectional polls of the inhabitants of the countries (Treis-
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The quality of political institutions is hard to measure empirically, but an number of
alternative measures are available. To keep as closely as possible to the theoretical model,
we have chosen to use an index of the quality of governance institutions constructed by
Kaufmann et al. (1999), called the voice and accountability index. This index aggregates
indicators of various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights with
the purpose of measuring the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate
in the selection of their government and able to hold their chosen government accountable
for its policy choices. The variable has been re-scaled to lay in the interval 0 (weak
institutions) to 1 (strong institutions).
Table 1 shows a cross tabulation of the countries according to their score on the cor-
ruption perception index and on the voice and accountability index. While countries that
are not perceived to be very corrupt tend to have good institutions, there is a fair share
of countries that, in spite of being perceived to be corrupt still score well on the voice
and accountability index. Moreover, we note that poor countries are perceived to be more
corrupt than rich countries, with the notable exception of Italy.
[Table 1 to appear here].
We estimate the model on a cross-section of 68 countries drawn from all ve continents.
Growth is measured as average GDP growth over the period 1996-2000 computed from the
PPP-adjusted GDP gures contained in the Penn World Data Tables (Heston et al., 2002).
We estimate a number of di¤erent specications of the model. All specications control
for the initial level of GDP in 1995, but di¤er in the set of control variables included in the
growth regression and in the instrumental variables used to generate exogenous variation
in corruption. Among the control variables, we include a number of (exogenous) economic
factors that are likely to a¤ect economic growth. This include the population growth rate,
man, 2000). These observations give some condence that these measures do capture important aspects of
corruption in a consistent way. Yet, since views on corruption can be inuenced by the economic circum-
stances of a particular country, it cannot be ruled out entirely that the indices partly capture economic
outcomes rather than corruption per se, nor can it be ruled out that they capture other aspects of the
governance environment than corruption. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of
the analysis.
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a measure of human capital formation and the investment ratio. We also report the results
from a more parsimonious specication that only controls for regional e¤ects.
For each of these specications, we present results for alternative sets of instruments
for corruption. As discussed in Section 2, two approaches to isolate exogenous variation
in corruption (and other government diversion policies) has been proposed in the recent
literature. One approach is to look for deep historical, geographical, or cultural factors
such as distance from equator, population share with English as their mother tongue,
settler mortality, the size of a country, legal tradition and so on. Another, advocated by
Persson (2004), is to use constitutional rules, such as age of democracy, election rules,
regime type (presidential versus parliamentarian), as an exogenous source of variation in
corruption. We use a combination of these two types of instruments. Among the historical
and cultural instruments, we include distance from equator, the area of the country, and
legal tradition. Distance from equator reects, as pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999)
and Acemoglu et al. (2001) among others, the depth of European cultural inuence and
is strongly correlated with the incidence of tropical disease among early European settlers
and thus their incentive to build good institutions. Area captures an important aspect of
the natural environment of a country and is negatively correlated with corruption (Led-
erman et al. 2005). This correlation is not surprising: it is reasonable to suppose that
larger countries need to develop better quality institutions to e¤ectively protect their and
rule their territory. Legal tradition measures whether the legal code of a country be-
longs to the common law family or not. Legal systems di¤er in the degree of protection
and the opportunities for recourse they o¤er to private property owners against corrupt
o¢ cials and derive from historical factors such as colonization. La Porta et al. (1999)
argue that common law systems o¤er greater protection of property against the state and
therefore reduce the potential for corruption relative to other legal systems and that the
legal tradition a¤ects development (growth) only through this channel.33 In addition to
these historical and cultural instruments, we also consider one of the constitutional rules
33We have also tried a number of alternative instruments for corruption such as the Index of Ethnolin-
guistic Fractionalisation (Mauro, 1995), but the results are similar to those presented below.
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instrument used by Persson (2004)34: the age of democracy, measured as the number of
years of uninterrupted democratic rule going back from year 2000. Persson and Tabellini
(2003, chapter 5) argue that countries with a longer democratic tradition have developed
better and more e¤ective means of controlling corruption (and other diversion policies
pursued by governments). Accordingly, age of democracy captures the notion that older
democracies are likely to pursue systematically di¤erent policies than newer ones, but is
in itself not a determinant of growth. Finally, since Caner and Hansens (2004) proce-
dure requires that the variable qi is exogenous and the quality of institutions only a¤ects
growth through the choice of regime, the voice and accountability index automatically
becomes an instrument for corruption. In conclusion, we believe that there are a priori
reasons why these ve variables are reasonable candidates for instruments. As we shall
see below, on purely statistical grounds, the ve instruments perform well in the sense of
passing Hansens J-test for over-identifying restrictions and in the sense of being relevant
determinants of corruption.
8 The Results
In this section, we report the results from our examination of the empirical relationship
between economic growth and corruption. As a benchmark, we have estimated the econo-
metric model specied in equation (17) on the whole sample of countries without taking
the possibility of thresholds into account. A representative subset of the results in which
distance from Equator, area, and the voice and accountability index are used as instru-
ments are shown in Table 2. We note that corruption is insignicant in all specications.
Similar results obtain with the other instruments (not reported).35 Thus, when thresh-
olds are ignored, we are unable, within our particular sample, to identify any relationship
between corruption and growth.
[Table 2 to appear here].
34The other two instruments used by Persson (2004) electoral system and regime type do not generate
enough variation to allow separate identication of the two growth/corruption regimes and are therefore
not included in the analysis.
35The full set of results is available upon request.
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Next, we report in Tables 3a   c the estimates of equation (17) using the threshold
estimation technique and di¤erent sets of instrument variables.36 In all specications, we
nd a signicant threshold e¤ect and identify two separate growth/corruption regimes:
one regime with high quality institutions (voice and accountability index of more than
0.76 and including 19 countries) and another regime with low quality institution (voice
and accountability index of less than 0.76 and including 49 countries). The countries in
the regime with high quality institutions have, on average, higher growth rates and lower
levels of perceived corruption than countries in the regime with low quality institutions.
This is indicative of the existence of multiple equilibria, although, as stressed by Durlauf
and Johnson (1995), it is not conclusive evidence.37
The estimated impact of corruption on growth is di¤erent in the two regimes. In the
regime with high quality institutions, corruption reduces the growth rate in all specica-
tions. Using the point estimates from Table 3a, we nd that a one unit increase in the
corruption perception index reduces growth by between 0.14 and 0.28 percentage points.
Alternatively, if the Costa Rica could increase its score on the average corruption percep-
tion index from 6.2 to the level of Denmark (which has a score of 9.3), the growth rate of
Costa Rica would, ceteris paribus, increase by 0.43-0.87 percentage points. The estimated
e¤ect is larger still when age of democracy and legal tradition, respectively, are used as
instruments for corruption (see Tables 3b and 3c).
In the regime with low quality institutions, the impact of corruption on growth is less
robustly estimated, and the specic results are sensitive to the choice of instruments and
control variables. In Table 3a, where we use distance from equator, area and the voice
and accountability index as instruments, the results suggest that corruption increases
the growth rate, although the e¤ect is only signicant in the specication with regional
dummies.38 In Tables 3b and 3c, where we use age of democracy and legal tradition, re-
36We note that in all the reported specications, we cannot reject the over-identifying restrictions (using
Hansens J-test) and that the instruments are highly signicant in the rst-stage regressions.
37The two regimes can be consistent with a single equilibrium if the equilibrium locus has a discontinuity
and some countries are below and other above the discontinuity point.
38The positive relationship between corruption and growth is even stronger in specications that use
legal tradition, area and the voice and accountability index as instruments (not reported).
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spectively, as instruments, the estimates do point in the direction of a negative relationship
between corruption and growth, but the e¤ect is never statistically signicant.
9 Discussion
The paper provides a theoretical and an empirical investigation of the links between cor-
ruption, economic growth, and political institutions that take the possibility of threshold
e¤ects and the possibility of multiple equilibria into account. The theoretical model high-
lights a particular mechanism through which this can happen and stresses the role of politi-
cal institutions and complementarity between economic growth and corruption. The model
is consistent with the empirical results in the sense of identifying two corruption/growth
regimes.
Empirically, our results highlight the importance of allowing for non-linear e¤ects in the
mapping from corruption (and other divergent government policies) to economic growth.
Only when the sample is split according to the quality of political institutions is it possible
to establish a signicant link between corruption and growth in the sample of countries
under consideration. This suggests that regime-specic di¤erences are important. Of
particular interest is the result that, conditional on having weak institutions, corruption is
not associated with worse growth outcomes, and, if anything, there may even be a small
positive impact. This is a surprising nding, which is not consistent with our theory.
The nding may instead be related to the greasing the wheels hypothesis of corruption:
given decient institutions, corruption may allow the economy to work more smoothly by
allowing individuals to circumvent the worse of these deciencies (Le¤, 1964). This, of
course, leaves out the broader question of why the institutions are decient in the rst
place, the answer to which might well be related to corruption itself.
We conclude by raising three caveats related to the interpretation of our empirical
results. First, as already pointed out above, the fact that we identify two distinct cor-
ruption/growth regimes cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of multiple equilibria.
Nonetheless, the nding is suggestive. From a policy point of view, the existence (or not)
of multiple equilibria is important because it determines whether large-scale institutional
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reforms as opposite to piecemeal and gradual reforms are needed to move countries out of
the low growth/high corruption regime. Second, although our instruments are statistically
valid in the sense of Hansens J-test and relevant in the sense of explaining corruption, one
may still worry that there exist variables omitted from the reported growth regressions
that are correlated with the instruments and that the estimates therefore remain biased.
We have tried to address this issue by using a range of di¤erent instruments. We take
some comfort in the fact that the results point in the same direction: negative impact of
corruption conditional on high quality institutions and no or a small positive impact of
corruption conditional on decient institutions. Third, we emphasize that the evidence is
based on a limited cross section of countries covering a relatively short time period in the
late 1990s. Caner and Hansens (2004) procedure does not allow for a panel structure, so
combined cross section time series analysis must await further advances in methodology.
Moreover, the fact that the earliest corruption perception data are from the mid-1980s
makes it questionable to include corruption perception indices in long-run growth regres-
sions and we believe the best approach, however imperfect it may be, it to focus on the
link between corruption and short-run growth.
10 Appendix A: Data
Table A1 shows that descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the econometric
analysis.
[Table A1 to appear here].
The following variables are used in the analysis:
1. The corruption perception index is measured as an average of up to 12 di¤erent cor-
ruption perception indices as compiled by Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org).
2. The voice and accountability index measures aspects of the political process, civil
liberties and political rights related to the extent to which citizens can participate
in the election of their governments and are able to hold them accountable for their
policy choices. (Kaufmann et al., 1999).
3. Age of democracy is measured as the number of years with uninterrupted democratic
rule, going backwards from year 2000 (democracy dened as the rst year in which
the POLITY IV index is positive). (constructed from Marshall and Jaggers, 2000).
4. GDP per capita, PPP adjusted, is taken from Penn World Data Tables, version 6.1.
(Heston et al., 2002).
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5. Investment share of GDP is taken from PennWorld Data Tables, version 6.1. (Heston
et al., 2002).
6. Human capital is measured as the percentage of population in primary education in
1995. (Barro and Lee, 2001).
7. Population growth is from Penn World Data Tables, version 6.1. (Heston et al.,
2002).
8. Legal tradition is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company law or commercial
code of the country is the English Common Law. (La Porta et al., 1999).
9. Distance from equator is the distance from equator (in degrees), ranging between -90
to 90. (Hall and Jones, 1999).
11 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that
maxfp(1 + g); q(1 + g)g  (1 + g) < 1 (21)
Incentive compatibility requires that
Vt(C) = V

t  Vt(D) for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::. (22)
By routine substitution, using equations (3) and (5), we get that Vt(C)  Vt(D) if, and
only if
ICt bzt + (p  q) 1X
k=0
(p)kbzt+1+k  Tt (23)
for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::. The electorate wants to minimize rent extraction
P
k 
kzt+k subject to
incentive compatibility constraints fICt+kg1k=0 for all t, yieldingbzt   qbzt+1 = Tt(1  p(1 + g)) for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::. (24)
Substitution, using the fact that Tt = a0(1 + g)tT , yields
bzt = T (1  p(1 + g))a0(1 + g)t 1X
k=0
(q(1 + g))k (25)
which can be simplied to get zt dened in equation (8). Any sequence bzt  zt is incentive
compatible
Proof of Proposition 3. To simplify notation dene k(g)  1 p(1+g)
1 q(1+g)T . Constraints
(11) and (12) in problem (10) are binding at each t. We can, therefore, combine the two
constraints at each t and consider the following sequence of one-period Lagrangians
Lt = 
t [at(1   t) + atxat + t [atF (1   t + x)  atxt   atk(g)]] : (26)
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where t is the multiplier on the (joint) constraint at time t. It is clear that the solution
must have  t and xt strictly positive, and that t > 0 for all t. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
at time t imply
 1 + t [F (1   t + xt )   tf(1   t + xt )] = 0; (27)
x 1t   t

 tf(1   t + xt )x 1t   1

= 0; (28)
F (1   t + xt )  xt   k(g) = 0: (29)
We note that any solution must be stationary. Let f ; xg be a candidate solution to
the problem. Observe that
[F (1   + x)  f(1   + x)] = 0 (30)
and 
f(1   + x)x 1   1 = 0 (31)
at  =   and x = x. Equation (27) and (28) then imply that   <   and x > x for all
t. Rearrange equations (27) to get
 =
1
[F (1   + x)  f(1   + x)] (32)
and rewrite equation (28) as
x 1F (1   + x)  1 = 0: (33)
Equations (29) and (33) determine the constrained e¢ cient  and x uniquely. To prove
this, we write
h1( ; x) = F (1   + x)  x  k = 0; (34)
h2( ; x) = x
 1F (1   + x)  1 = 0: (35)
For  <   and x > x, we got
@h1( ; x)
@x
= f (:)x 1   1 < 0 (36)
@h1( ; x)
@
= F (:)  f (:) > 0 (37)
@h2( ; x)
@x
= x 2 [xf (:)  (1  )F (:)] < 0 (38)
@h2( ; x)
@
=  x 1f (:) < 0 (39)
where a su¢ cient condition for @h2(;x)
@x
< 0 is that F is uniform on [0; ]. Thus, for  <  
and x > x, we see that
d
dx

h1
=  
@h1(;x)
@x
@h1(;x)
@
> 0 (40)
and
d
dx

h2
=  
@h2(;x)
@x
@h2(;x)
@
< 0 (41)
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Proof. Notice that h1( ; x) > 0 so h1( 0; x) = 0 implies that  0 <   because
F (1   + x)  x = T at f ; xg and 1 p(1+g)
1 q(1+g) < 1. Notice that h2(
; x) = 0 because
F (1   +x) = f(1   +x) and x 1f(1   +x) = 1 at f ; xg. Thus, there exist
one and only one solution to equations (29) and (33). The proposition follows by setting
fb ; bxg = f ; xg
Proof of Proposition 4. Let b = 1  b  + (bx) and let
 =
@h1( ; x)
@
@h2( ; x)
@x
  @h1( ; x)
@x
@h2( ; x)
@
(42)
= (F (:)  f (:))x 2 (  1)F (:) + f (:)x 1  Fx 1   1
where  < 0 at fb ; bxg and the functions h1 and h2 are dened in the proof to proposition
3. Using Cramers rule, we nd that
@b 
@g
=
@h2(b;bx)
@x
@k
@g

< 0 (43)
@bx
@g
=
@h1(b;bx)
@
@k
@g

> 0 (44)
and so @b
@g
> 0. The proposition follows from the fact that the size of the formal sector
F () is decreasing in  until the point where all workers are in the formal sector
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